INTRODUCTION
In Olim v. Wainekona,' the United States Supreme Court clarified its position as to when the involuntary relocation of a duly convicted prisoner implicates a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, held that an interstate prison transfer does not directly deprive the inmate of any liberty interest protected by the due process clause, even if the transfer involves long distances and an ocean crossing. 3 The Court further held that Hawaii's prison regulations 4 do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest because they do not substantially limit the prison administrator's discretion in making transfer decisions. 5 An analysis of the Court's recent treatment of other cases involving prison transfers yields the conclusion that the Wainekona Court logically and convincingly applied the "entitlement" 6 view of liberty interests in deciding that the transfer did not directly implicate the due process clause. In the second part of the opinion, the Court correctly decided that Hawaii's prison regulations do not create such a liberty interest. Here, the majority applied the correct standards concerning the issue of official discretion, while the dissent wrongly viewed Wakinekona as indistinguishable from a seemingly inconsistent previous decision of the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
While he was serving a sentence of life imprisonment without possi-violated the purpose of the program classification hearing as governed by Hawaii state regulations. Wakinekona, 459 F. Supp. at 474-75. According to paragraph I of Rule IV, the classification process never inflicts punishment; on the contrary, even the imposition of a stricter classification is intended to be in the best interests of the individual, the State, and the community. In short, classification is a continuing evaluation of each individual to ensure that he is given the optimum placement within the Corrections Division. Hawaii, Supplementary Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, 1, (1976 mined that the transfer regulations embodied in Rule IV, which require that certain procedures be followed whenever a transfer involves a "grievous loss" to the prisoner, 2 5 "create a justifiable expectation that a prisoner will not be transferred absent the specified procedures" and "consequently give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
' 26
The Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument that the prison administrator has unfettered discretion to transfer inmates at will, stating that the procedural conditions "certainly do not contemplate" such a transfer. 27 The court decided that Wakinekona, who had not been given an impartial tribunal 2 8 had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore reversed the District Court's dismissal of his suit.
29
The court declined to address the issue of whether the transfer of Wakinekona from Hawaii to California directly implicated the due process clause because it concluded that the state regulations did create a liberty interest.
30
Before the Court of Appeals handed down its decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that Rule IV did not limit the administrator's discretion in transferring prisoners, and therefore does not "clothe" plaintiffs with a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 27 Id. at 712. Further, the court maintained that the purpose of the procedural requirements, "to protect against arbitrary or uninformed action" by the prison official, "cannot be reduced to constitutional insignificance." Id.
28 The court agreed with Wakinekona's claim that, because the Committee that had recommended his transfer also initiated his transfer proceedings, he had been deprived of an impartial tribunal. Id. Cir. 1977) . In Lombardo, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a prisoner's claim that his transfer from one Massachusetts prison to another violated the due process clause, because the statutes and regulations in question did not "establish that Massachusetts law limits transfers to those instances in which specified events have occurred." 548 F.2d at 15. The regulations, stated the court, "simply provide that an inmate will receive a certain type of a hearing before he is reclassified." Id. The court concluded that the provisions were either merely "general statements of the purposes of the Massachusetts system of corrections" or "general directives to the correctional system as to how to treat inmates." Id.
In Cofone, the Second Circuit held that a statute authorizing the Connecticut Commissioner of Corrections to transfer a state prisoner into federal custody when the inmate needs special treatment or facilities, does not create a justifiable expectation for the prisoner that he would not be transferred absent misbehavior or other specified event. 594 F.2d at 938. Thus, the transfer of a prisoner from a Connecticut correctional institution to a federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, did not violate the due process clause. ' 41 In Wakinekona, the Court rejected respondent Wakinekona's argument that confinement of a Hawaii prisoner on the mainland is "qualitatively different" from the normal circumstances faced such by a prisoner. 42 Instead, the Court decided that the interstate transfer of Wakinekona, which involved long distances and an ocean crossing, differed from an intrastate transfer only in degree, not in kind. 43 In Meachum, the Court had held that the "Due Process Clause in and of itself [does not] protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system." 4 4 Hence, because the determining factor in such a due process inquiry is the "nature of the interest involved rather than its weight," 45 the Wakinekona Court was compelled under Meachum to conclude that an interstate prison transfer, even from Hawaii to California, does not directly deprive the prisoner of any liberty interest protected by the due process clause. 46 As further support for this decision, the Court noted that an inmate "has no justifiable expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State, '47 indeed, that confinement in the prisoner's home state will often not be possible for a variety of reasons. 48 Justice Marshall then concluded that the majority had wrongly decided that Hawaii's prison regulations give the administrator complete discretion in transferring prisoners, and that, in actuality, the regulations do create a liberty interest. 72 He noted that Rule IV establishes procedural rules 73 and limitations on official discretion 74 that "are at least as substantial as those found sufficient to create a liberty interest in Hewitt v. Helms,"
' 75 a case decided earlier in the Term. 76 And, while he concluded that Rule IV does provide that the ultimate decision rests solely in the hands of the prison administrator, Marshall nevertheless reasoned that the regulations created a "protectible expectation" that transfers would not occur for wholly arbitrary reasons. 77 As additional support for his conclusion that the regulations do create a protected liberty interest, Marshall cited the Court's decision in Hewitt, which "reject[ed] the view that state laws which impose substantive limitations and elaborate procedural requirements on official conduct create no liberty interest solely because there remains the possibility that an official another jurisdiction in 1979; that less than 1% nationwide were transferred to other jurisdictions; and that 70% of all state inmates are in institutions less than 250 miles from home. 73 Justice Marshall noted that the "procedural rules are cast in mandatory language and cover such matters as notice, access to information, hearing, confrontation and cross-examination, and the basis on which the [Program] Committee is to make its recommendation to the faculty administrator." Id. at 1751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74 The dissent viewed the purpose clause of Rule IV as restricting the administrator's discretion. Id. at 1752. This clause provides that transfers are intended to ensure an inmate's "optimum placement" in consideration of "his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors." Id. at 1751 n. 
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The Meachum Court clarified the nature of the liberty interest a prisoner actually possesses under this "entitlement" approach. The Court noted that a prisoner has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being confined "within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose." 8 4 Specifically, the prisoner has a liberty interest in not being subjected to confinement that brings about "consequences . . . qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime. " 85 The majority in Wainekona correctly applied these standards in concluding that the difference between Wakinekona's transfer, which involved a long distance and an ocean crossing, and an intrastate transfer or interstate transfer of shorter distance is "a matter of degree, not of kind." 8 6 1 The Court appropriately noted that respondent faced the same hardships that intrastate transferees suffered: separation from home, family, and inmate friends; placement in a possibly hostile environment; interruption of educational and rehabilitative programs; and difficulty in contacting counsel. 8 7 The Court correctly reasoned that the circumstances of respondent's transfer affected the weight and not the nature of the interest involved. Surely respondent faced quantilatively greater hardships than do most prison transfers, but nevertheless "[t]he fact that his confinement takes place outside Hawaii is merely a fortuitous consequence of the fact that he must be confined, not an additional element of his punishment." 8 Wainekona can be distinguished from Vitek v. Jones, 89 where the Court held that involuntary commitment of prisoners to a mental hospital was not "within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual." 9° Whereas Wakinekona's transfer would subject him to essentially the same hardships that faced the intrastate transferees in Meachum, it would not subject him to two kinds of losses suffered by the transferee to a mental hospital: namely, the stigmatizing effects of such a transfer and the mandatory behavior modification therapy given for mental illness. 9 1 Hence, a justifiable expectation does occur that an inmate will not be transferred to a mental hospital absent a due process hearing concerning his classification as "mentally ill" because placement in a mental hospital, unlike an inter-for the occurrence of the action. 1 0 0
It is clear that Rule IV is quite different from regulations that have been found to have "objective and defined" criteria for decisionmaking. In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,"'l the Court utilized this standard for "substantive limitation on official discretion" in holding that the Nebraska statutory language created a protectible expectation of parole. 1 0 2
The statute in question provided that the Board of Parole "shall" order an eligible prisoner's release on parole "unless" deferral is mandated by any of four specific substantive determinations. 1 0 3 Further, the statute provided a detailed list of fourteen explicit factors and one all-inclusive factor which the Board was obligated to take into consideration in reaching a parole decision. Unlike the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, Rule IV contains neither detailed criteria and standards nor language of a substantially mandatory nature. While the Greenholtz statute specifically set forth four situations under which deferral of a prisoner's release on parole is mandated, 1 0 6 Rule IV does not mention any substantive predicates that must occur before a transfer is effected. Instead, Rule IV merely states that the general purpose of transfers is to ensure the "optimum placement"' 1 7 of prisoners and serve the "best interests of the individual, the State, and the community."' 1 0 8 Further, while the Nebraska statute set forth in detailed fashion fourteen factors which the Board of Parole is obligated to take into consideration, Rule IV only generally mentions that the classification process "considers the individual, his history, his changing needs, the resources and facilities available to the Corrections Division, the other inmates/wards, the exigencies of the community, and any other relevant factors."' 1 9 Also, Rule IV employs mandatory language only with respect to procedural matters that the Program Committee must afford the prisoner, and not to any substantive predicates that must occur before the prisoner is transferred. Use of mandatory language in a statute or regulation is not sufficient to make
